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Abstract
In this paper, we study an eco-industry providing an environmental service to a com-
petitive polluting sector. We show that even if this eco-industry is highly concentrated,
a standard environmental policy based on a Pigouvian tax or a pollution permit market
reaches the rst-best outcome, challenging the Tinbergen rule. To illustrate this point,
we rst consider an upstream monopoly selling eco-services to a representative pollut-
ing rm. We progressively extend our result to heterogeneous downstream polluters and
heterogeneous upstream Cournot competitors. Finally, we underline some limits of this
result. It does not hold under the assumption of abatement goods or downstream market
power. In this last case, we obtain Barnetts result.
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1. Introduction
The so-called Environmental Goods and Services Sector (EGSS hereafter) and its
link to environmental regulation is nowadays clearly recognized. This sector "includes
the provision of environmental technologies, goods and services for every kind of use,
i.e. intermediate and nal consumption as well as gross capital formation" (Eurostats
handbook on EGSS [13]). Even if some methodological problems remain (see the UNEP
report, [35]), the EGSS is largely documented by most of the statistical institutes.4 They
agree upon the fact that the size of the EGSS remains relatively moderate: the share of
the EGSS gross value-added in the GDP is around 2.0% in both Europe and the US. But
they also point out the notable growth rate of this sector, its capacity to generate new
job opportunities and its export performance. For instance, estimates for the European
Union show an increase of EGSS output per unit of GDP of 50 % between 2000 and 2011,
while employment grew at around 40%.
Two other observations concerning the EGSS seem to be important. First, it is widely
acknowledged that this sector is controlled by worldwide rms like CH2M Hill, Veolia
Environmental Services, Vivendi Environment or Suez Environnement. The Ecorys report
[11] on the European EGSS even mentions that 10% of the companies account for almost
80% of the operating revenue. Secondly, a large share of EGSS activity is dedicated to
the provision of environmental services. Environmental services represent more than 40%
of this sectors activity (see Sainclair Desgagné [33] table 2) and are largely involved in
international trade.5
These two last observations motivate our paper. The question is quite simple: should
we regulate a polluting industry in the same way when these rms supply abatement goods
to an imperfectly competitive eco-industry as when they supply abatement services? This
raises a second question: what is the di¤erence between abatement goods and abatement
services? If we follow the Eurostats handbook on EGSS [11]: "Services are outputs
produced to order and which cannot be traded separately from their production. Services
are not separate entities over which ownership rights can be established". In the context of
end-of-pipe abatement, this means that the polluter buys "pollution reduction" without
concerning itself about the way this task is performed: it simply outsources this activity.
This is, for instance, the case for waste management, water sewerage and treatment,
remediation and clean-up activities. In other words, since services are not separate entities,
they cannot be used as an input in the polluters production process, unlike environmental
goods such as lters, scrubbers or incinerators, over which the polluter keeps some control.
This simple observation fundamentally modies the polluters purchasing behavior. When
4Several empirical studies have recently sought to quantify the EGSS. For instance, the Canadian
statistical institute [34] conducts a biennial survey of the EGGS (http: //www.statcan.gc.ca /eng /sur-
vey /business /1209). In Europe, Eurostats has initiated a study over 28 member states (see http:
//ec.europa.eu /eurostat /statistics-explained /index.php /Environmental_goods_and_services_sector)
based on a methodology described in Eutostats [13]. In 2010, the US department of commerce published
a survey called "Measuring the Green Economy" [36].
5See for instance the report of the US international trade commision [37].
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he buys abatement services, i.e. pollution reduction, he only makes a trade-o¤ between
the price of this service and the cost of non-compliance with an environmental act. While
for environmental goods, he must also take into account the marginal rate of pollution
abatement, since these goods are viewed as inputs that reduce emissions.
If the eco-industry is imperfectly competitive, the di¤erence between abatement goods
and abatement services also a¤ects the expected demand for abatement and therefore the
strategic behaviors of the members of this industry. For instance, under a Pigouvian
tax, the purchasing behavior for abatement services is only motivated by the di¤erence
between the environmental tax and the price of the abatement service. Thus, the regulator
implicitly controls the market for abatement services by setting the level of the Pigouvian
tax. By exploiting these particular features, we show that the regulator can obtain the
rst-best outcome simply by setting a Pigovian tax equal to the marginal damage. In
other words, the rst-best outcome can be reached with only one economic policy tool,
although there are two market failures in this economy: market power on the market for
abatement services and pollution. This result challenges the Tinbergen rule and suggests
that the environmental agency must distinguish between the regulation of goods and the
regulation of services.
To the best of our knowledge, this distinction has not been introduced into the eco-
industry literature. If we invoke the previous Eurostatsdenition, most of the contri-
butions on these vertical structures are concerned with either environmental technologies
and R&D or the provision of abatement goods.
The rst branch considers the incentives provided by environmental policy instruments
for the adoption and development of advanced abatement technology (see Requate [27]
for an overview). Not all of these contributions explicitly introduce an EGSS, since
this requires innovation to be a private good. The studies which go in this direction
often consider an innovative rm investing in R&D to obtain a patent over a pollution-
reducing new technology. Within this framework, the performance of taxes and tradeable
permits are compared under various settings. Denicolo [10] and Requate [28] make these
comparisons under di¤erent timing and commitment regimes. A threat of imitation is
introduced by Fischer et al. [14] while Perino [25] studies green horizontal innovation,
where new technologies reduce pollution of one type while causing a new type of damage.
More recently, Perino [26] focuses on the second-best policies for all combinations of
emission intensity and marginal abatement costs.
The second branch, which is closer to our contribution, takes as given the existence of
imperfect competition in the eco-industry selling abatement goods to a polluting sector
and explores the second-best regulation policy under alternative instruments. Greaker
[16] and Greaker and Rosendahl [17] introduce emission standards. David and Sinclair-
Desgagné [7] and Canton et al. [6] explore the case of the Pigouvian tax, the former
with imperfect competition upstream and the latter with imperfect competition both
upstream and downstream, while Schwartz and Stahn [32] introduce tradable pollution
rights. Endres and Friehe [12] examine the impact of environmental liability laws. Some
other papers like David et al. [9] or Canton et al. [5] introduce the entry or merger of
rms in the eco-industry.
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Our contribution is also very close to Nimubona and Sinclair-Desgagné [24], who ini-
tiate a discussion about an internal abatement e¤ort and an external procurement of
abatement facilities. However, they do not depart from the Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas
[20] formulation of an end-of-pipe pollution which is common to almost all papers on
the eco-industry, according to which emissions depend on the levels of production and
abatement. Most of these papers also assume that abatement facilities have decreasing
returns. In other words, they function as an input and not as a service, which would
have constant returns.6 This is why the rst-best outcome can be obtained with only one
instrument, contrary to David and Sinclair-Desgagné [8], who introduce both Pigouvian
tax and subsidy.
The intuition behind our main result is quite simple. If a Pigouvian tax is imposed,
a polluter purchasing an eco-service either (i) prefers to pay the tax if the price of the
abatement service is higher, (ii) decides, in the opposite case, to fully abate the pollution
issued from its equilibrium production level, or (iii) is indi¤erent between the two if the
price and the tax are equal. This implies that the demand for eco-services becomes
perfectly elastic over a range of quantities which depends on the tax level, so that any
monopoly selling these services loses - at least partially - its market power. If the regulator
is able to set a tax level with the property that the monopoly solution belongs to this range
of quantities, he clearly destroys upstream monopoly power and has the opportunity, if
the downstream polluting market is competitive, to reach a rst-best allocation. Owing
to the structure of the demand for eco-services, this situation occurs when the monopoly
has an incentive to set the highest price for which the demand is positive, i.e. the tax
level, and to supply, due to marginal cost concerns, a quantity of services lower than the
one corresponding to full pollution abatement, so that we end up in a situation in which
the price equates the tax level and the marginal cost. If the e¢ cient abatement level does
not require full abatement, it remains for the regulator to set the Pigouvian tax at the
optimal marginal damage in order to obtain the rst best.
This argument clearly holds with homogeneous competitive polluters, an eco-service
monopoly and an optimal abatement level that does not require full abatement. That is
why we start with this benchmark case. We then show that our argument can easily be
extended in order to (i) include the "boundary" solutions corresponding to e¢ cient full
pollution abatement,7 (ii) take into account regulation by a pollution permit market, and
(iii) consider polluters who are heterogeneous with regard to their production costs and
emissions. The extension of our analysis to Cournot competition in the eco-industry is
less obvious, which is why we have dedicated a whole section to this study. As both main
assumptions nevertheless remain in this new case - upstream eco-services and downstream
6Our end-of-pipe emission reduction technology can therefore be viewed as a particular case of the
Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas [20] emission function in which the abatement good has constant returns
to scale. To the best of our knowledge, this case has not been explored, probably for technical reasons:
standard di¤erential calculus does not really apply and corner solutions emerge.
7The case of e¢ cient full downstream pollution abatement is particularly conceivable if the upstream
eco-industry is also polluting, as in Sans et al. [30].
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perfect competition - our result still holds. We nally exhibit some limits of our analysis,
taking into account rst abatement goods and then downstream imperfect competition.
This last section enables us rstly, to underline the fact that the existence of eco-services is
crucial, and secondly, to extend Barnetts results [2] on Pigouvian taxation to eco-service
industries.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
presents the simplest case: downstream homogeneous polluters and an upstreammonopoly.
Section 4 introduces some straightforward extensions: downstream full abatement, pol-
lution permit market and heterogeneous downstream rms. Section 5 is dedicated to
Cournot competition in the eco-industry. Section 6 challenges both main assumptions:
environmental services and downstream perfect competition. Finally, some concluding
remarks are given in Section 7 and technical proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2. A basic model of environmental services
We rst present the main assumptions of the model and then we characterize the
rst-best allocation.
2.1. The main assumptions
We consider a standard polluting industry rst characterized by a representative rm
which produces a quantity Q at a given cost c(Q) and latter by heterogeneous rms. This
cost is increasing and convex (i.e., c0(Q) > 0 and c00(Q) > 0), inaction is allowed (i.e.,
c(0) = 0), c0(0) = 0 and limq!+1 c0(q) = +1. This activity is polluting. Emissions
are given by "(Q), an increasing and convex function (i.e., "0(Q) > 0 and "00(Q) > 0)
which satises "(0) = 0, "0(0) = 0 and limq!+1 "0(q) = +1. This dirty rm can buy
environmental services to reduce its "end-of-pipe" pollution. In doing so, a part A of its
emissions is abated by a specialized external rm and the remaining pollution is E =
max f"(Q)  A; 0g.
The eco-services are supplied on a non-competitive market at price pA. We initially
assume that these services are provided by a monopoly. This rm is characterized by an
increasing and convex cost function and inaction is allowed (i.e., 0(a) > 0, 00(a) > 0
and (0) = 0). We also assume that 0(0) = 0 to ensure that the eco-service market is
activated when an environmental policy is implemented.8
The environmental damage induced by the remaining emissions E is measured by a
standard damage function D(E). As usual, this function is increasing and convex (i.e.,
D0(E) > 0 and D00(E) > 0) and without emission there is no damage (i.e., D(0) = 0). We
8A discussion about the emergence of an eco-industry related to the fact that 0(0) > 0 can be found
in Canton et al. [6].
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also set D0(0) = 0. This last assumption is essentially made for convenience: it ensures
that full abatement never occurs at an e¢ cient allocation.9
Finally, to close the model, we introduce an inverse demand function for the polluting
goods P (Q). This function is decreasing (i.e., P 0(Q) < 0) and veries that limQ!0 P (Q) =
+1 and limQ!+1 P (Q) = 0.
2.2. The rst-best allocation
Under these assumptions, a rst-best allocation is given by:
 
Qopt; Aopt
 2 arg max
Q;A0
Z Q
0
P (q) dq   c (Q) D (max f" (Q)  A; 0g)  (A) (1)
This is typically a non-smooth optimization problem, but remember that we have as-
sumed that D(0) = 0 and D0(0) = 0. The rst equality ensures that the optimal
level of abatement cannot be larger than emissions because abatement is costly, hence
" (Qopt) Aopt  0, while the second combined with the positivity of the marginal cost of
abatement ensures that this inequality holds strictly. Consequently, the rst-best alloca-
tion is characterized by the usual rst order conditions:
P (Qopt)  c0  Qopt D0  "  Qopt  Aopt :"0  Qopt = 0 (2)
D0
 
"
 
Qopt
  Aopt  0(Aopt) = 0 (3)
Let us now introduce the function (Q) = P (Q) c
0(Q)
"0(Q) dened on [0; Qmax] where Qmax
stands for the optimal level of production without environmental damage (i.e., P (Qmax) =
c0 (Qmax)). This function measures, for each Q  Qmax, the marginal benet from an
additional unit of pollution. Therefore an optimal allocation has the property that the
marginal benet of pollution is equal to (i) the marginal damage and (ii) the marginal
cost of abating an additional unit of pollution:
(Qopt) = D0
 
"
 
Qopt
  Aopt = 0(Aopt) (4)
For later use, let us also notice this marginal benet is decreasing and (Qmax) = 0 so
that  1 : [0;+1]! [0; Qmax] is dened.
3. Upstream monopoly power and rst-best regulation
Let us rst show that a policy maker reaches the e¢ cient allocation with a standard
Pigouvian tax scheme even if the provider of environmental services has a monopoly power.
To illustrate this point, we proceed in three steps. We rst introduce a Pigouvian tax and
9If the marginal damage at zero is high enough and/or the marginal abatement cost is not too excessive,
the "end-of-pipe" pollution assumption, i.e., E = max f"(Q) A; 0g, can lead to an e¢ cient allocation
requiring full abatement (see Sans et al. [30] for a discussion). In Section 4.1, we extend our result to
this case, but this requires additional discussions which are not central to our main argument.
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compute the inverse demand for abatement services under a downstream market clearing
assumption. This brings us, in a second step, to the characterization of the behavior of
the upstream monopolist whatever the Pigouvian tax is. It remains, in the last step, to
show that a Pigouvian tax equal to the marginal damage regulates both environmental
and market power ine¢ ciencies.
3.1. The (inverse) demand for abatement services
The competitive dirty rm chooses its production supply and its demand for the
abatement good by solving:
max
Q0
8>>><>>>:pQ Q  c (Q) minA0 fpA  A+  max f" (Q)  A; 0gg| {z }
=CA(pA;;Q)
9>>>=>>>; (5)
An inspection of the cost minimization part of this program shows that the conditional
demand for abatement services never exceeds " (Q) and that the objective function is
linear in A on [0; " (Q)]. Both properties imply that the conditional demand for abatement
services is either 0 or "(Q) when pA >  or pA <  respectively, and any quantity within
[0; " (Q)] if pA =  . Hence, the abatement cost is given by CA(pA; ; Q) = min fpA; g 
"(Q). The optimal product supply therefore solves the following FOC:
pQ   c0 (Q) min fpA; g  "0 (Q)  0 (with equality if Q > 0) (6)
If we now introduce the market clearing condition for the nal good, we can replace pQ by
P (Q), and, using the above denition of  (Q) ; i.e., the marginal benet of an additional
unit of pollution, this quantity is given by:
P (Q)  c0(Q)
"0(Q)
= min fpA; g ) Q (pA; ) =  1 (min fpA; g) (7)
and the demand for abatement services becomes:
Ad (pA; ) =
8<:
0 if pA > 
[0; " ( 1 ())] if pA = 
" ( 1 (pA)) if pA < 
(8)
The last two equations (Eqs (7) and (8)) stress the consequence of introducing abatement
services as opposed to abatement goods. In the rst case, the dirty rm simply delegates
its abatement activity to another rm, while in the second case, the rm buys additional
inputs which enter the production process and help to reduce pollution in a more or
less e¢ cient way. This means that the dirty rm considers that the marginal pollution
abatement of an environmental service is constant (even equal to one). Its purchasing
is therefore simply motivated by the di¤erence between the price of the service and the
Pigouvian tax. If the price is higher than the Pigouvian tax, it is optimal to pay the
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tax and to adjust the output level due to this additional cost. In the opposite case, the
rm totally abates its emissions but adjusts the production level, as previously, since the
abatement price now enters the global marginal production cost.
By introducing abatement services instead of abatement goods, we therefore obtain
a particular abatement demand curve (see Eq (8)) characterized by a at part when the
price is equal to the Pigouvian tax and a decreasing part for prices lower than this tax
and corresponding to full abatement. When this price goes to 0, we even observe, by our
above denition of , that the equilibrium production level will be equal to Qmax, the
production level without regulation. In other words, this demand has an upper bound
given by Ad (0; ) = " (Qmax) which is independent of  , so that the associated inverse
demand function is:
PA (A; ) = max

min

; 
 
" 1 (A)
	
; 0
	
(9)
3.2. The monopoly provision of environmental services
We now address the question of how a monopoly behaves in the face of such an inverse
demand curve. Since the demand is bounded from above by " (Qmax) which is reached at
a zero price, its production choice can be restricted to A 2 [0; " (Qmax)] and its optimal
decision solves:
max
A2[0;"(Qmax)]
fmin f; p(A)g  A   (A)g (10)
where p (A) =  (" 1 (A)) is the inverse demand curve corresponding to full pollution
abatement that occurs if the Pigouvian tax is larger than this price.
Since we maximize a continuous function on a compact set, existence is not a real issue.
But the characterization of this solution requires some additional concavity properties.
So let us assume, as usual for a monopoly, that ep(A) =
p0A
p
, the elasticity of p(A) is
decreasing and limA!"(Qmax) ep(A) is larger than  1.10
The inverse demand curvemin f; p(A)g nevertheless exhibits a at part since the dirty
rm only reacts to prices lower than the Pigouvian tax. We are therefore dealing with
a non-smooth optimization problem leading to several regimes delineated by thresholds
which are related to the levels of the Pigouvian tax.
To get some intuitions (see Figure 1), let us rst introduce the production level Am.
This corresponds to the monopoly solution under full pollution abatement behavior by
the dirty rm, i.e., the quantity that equates the marginal cost to the marginal revenue
computed with p(A). The price associated with this full abatement case is therefore given
by p(Am) = 11+ep(Am)
0(Am), where 11+ep(Am) stands for the standard margin taken by a
10Of course, the reader may object that these assumptions are not set on the primary data, especially
given that p(A) = 
 
" 1(A)

. Other su¢ cient conditions can be introduced, such as 2e" + e0   e"0 > 0
and e" + e > 0, where e denotes the elasticity.
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Figure 1: The monopoly solution as  decreases
monopolist. But this situation only occurs if the Pigouvian tax is higher than this price,
i.e.,   p(Am), otherwise the dirty rm pays the tax instead of abating pollution. This
means that there exists a tax rate tm implicitly given by:
m =
1
1+ep(p 1(m))
0(p 1 (m)) (11)
for which p(Am) = m, and we can conclude that, for  > m, the monopoly always
provides Am units of abatement services.
If the tax rate is lower than m, the monopoly is unable to reach this optimal outcome
simply because the monopoly price associated with full abatement is not reachable. In
this case, this rm has an incentive to choose the solution that leads to the highest price
p =  at the production level A = p 1(), i.e., to remain at the kink in the demand
function. But this behavior is only optimal for prices p =  which are larger than the
marginal production cost, i.e., 0(p 1()). If this is not the case, the rm will adjusts
its behavior to equate the tax rate with the marginal cost. This means that there exists
another threshold c < m with the property that 8 < c, the monopoly adopts, in some
sense, a competitive behavior. This new threshold is given by:
c = 
0(p 1 (c)) (12)
From this discussion, we conclude that:
Lemma 1. Under our assumptions, (i) the monopoly problem (Eq 10) has a unique so-
lution for each tax rate, (ii) there exist two unique thresholds c and m which solve Eq
9
(12) and Eq (11) respectively, (iii) the monopoly provision of abatement services is, for
any tax  , a continuous function given by:
Am () =
8<: (
0) 1 () if  < c
p 1() = " ( 1 ()) if  2 [c; m]
Am = p
 1(m) = " ( 1 (m)) if  > m
(13)
(iv) the price of these services is PmA () = min f; mg, and (v) from Eq (7), the production
of the dirty good is:
Qm () =  1 (min f; mg) (14)
3.3. The e¢ cient regulation of emissions
The previous lemma has an interesting consequence: for any tax rate lower than c,
the monopoly behaves like a competitive rm. This rm equates its marginal cost with
the tax rate, which is nothing other than the price of the abatement services. Since the
polluting rm also behaves competitively, the regulator should be able to implement the
rst-best allocation, by selecting, as in a competitive case, a Pigouvian tax equal to the
marginal damage of pollution, i.e., by setting  opt = D0 (" (Qopt)  Aopt).
This point is obvious as long as  opt < c. In this case, we know, from Eq (13), that
the monopoly provision of environmental services veries 0(Am ( opt)) =  opt, while Eq
(14) says that  (Qm ( opt)) =  opt, and since  and 0 are both monotonic, we conclude,
by identication with Eq (4), that Qm ( opt) = Qopt and Am ( opt) = Aopt, i.e., that the
rst-best allocation is reached.
It therefore remains to verify that  opt < c. Intuitively, c is by denition (see Figure
1) (i) the highest tax level at which the monopoly behaves competitively and (ii) the lowest
rate at which full abatement occurs, so that any tax  < c induces perfect competition
and partial abatement. Since there is also partial abatement at the optimum,  opt should
be one of them. If this is not the case, i.e.  opt  c , we know from the denition of the
threshold c (see Eq (12)) that:
 opt  0(p 1   opt), (0) 1   opt  "   1   opt since p(A) =   " 1 (A) (15)
Moreover, by Eq (4), which characterizes the rst-best solution, (0) 1 ( opt) = Aopt and
 1 ( opt) = Qopt, so that Aopt  " (Qopt). But from our discussion about the e¢ cient
allocation, we know that the assumptions D(0) = D0(0) = 0 ensure that there is always
a residual pollution at the optimum, i.e., that " (Qopt) > Aopt. We can therefore say:
Proposition 1. Even if an upstream monopoly controls the price of the environmen-
tal services while the downstream commodity market remains competitive, the regulator
reaches the rst-best by setting the Pigouvian tax at the marginal damage of the emissions
(evaluated at the rst-best), i.e., by setting  opt = D0 (" (Qopt)  Aopt).
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4. Some straightforward extensions
The previous result suggests that the existence of a residual pollution at the optimal
outcome is a crucial assumption. However, as we will see, this is only a simplifying
assumption: an identical result can be obtained for D0(0) 6= 0. In this section, we can also
examine whether the result is maintained when the regulator uses a di¤erent incentive-
based mechanism such as tradable pollution permits. The answer is again yes as long
as this new market is competitive. Finally, we relax the representative polluting rm
assumption and investigate heterogeneous polluters.
4.1. E¢ cient regulation and full abatement
To illustrate this point, let us return to the construction of the e¢ cient outcome and
relax D0(0) = 0 11. This outcome solves the optimization program (Eq (1)) introduced in
Section 2.2. But if we only assume that D(0) = 0; we can only argue that " (Q) A  0,
(i.e., without a strict inequality). The interior rst-order optimality conditions given by
Eqs (2) and (3) must therefore be amended. If  denotes the associated Lagrangian
multiplier, the new FOC become:8<:
P (Qopt)  c0 (Qopt)  (D0 (" (Qopt)  Aopt)  ) "0 (Qopt) = 0
D0 (" (Qopt)  Aopt)  0(Aopt)   = 0
 (" (Qopt)  Aopt) = 0 and   0
(16)
If the constraint is not binding, we are, of course, back in the case of partial abatement,
analyzed above. So let us concentrate on the case in which  > 0. In this situation,
the rst and second conditions of system (16) suggest that an e¢ cient allocation has the
property that the marginal benet (Qopt) of an additional unit of pollution must be equal
to the marginal abatement cost. But to achieve full abatement, this marginal benet only
needs to be smaller than the marginal damage of the rst unit of pollution. This situation
essentially occurs if D0(0) is high enough. In this case, the e¢ cient allocation veries:
Eopt = " (Qopt)  Aopt = 0
(Qopt) = 0(Aopt) < D0(0)
(17)
instead of the interior condition introduced in Eq. (4).
Let us now return to the monopoly case. Since the marginal damage never enters the
denition of the di¤erent behaviors, the monopoly outcome depicted in Lemma 1 remains
unchanged. This means that we simply have to ensure that the regulator is able to obtain
the rst-best solution when it is optimal to abate all the pollution (i.e. for  > 0).
So let us assume that he sets the Pigouvian tax at  opt =  c given by Eq (12). From
Lemma 1, the equilibrium abatement and production levels are Am( c) = " ( 1 ( c))
and Qm( c) =  1 ( c), so that the rst optimality condition of Eq (17) is satised. It
11This situation is, for instance, met when the damage function is linear. Full abatement is required
when the damage coe¢ cient is large enough.
11
then remains for us to use the denition of  c to verify the second condition. This is
c = 
0(p 1 (c)), so that  (Qm( c)) = 0 (Am (c)). We can therefore note:
Proposition 2. Assume that the marginal damage of the rst unit of pollution is su¢ -
ciently large for full abatement to become the e¢ cient outcome. If the regulator sets the
Pigouvian tax at  opt =  c given by Eq (12), he again obtains the rst-best outcome.
4.2. Pollution permit market
Let us now verify that our result also holds if the regulator implements a pollution
permit market instead of a Pigouvian tax. To illustrate this point, let us return to the
monopoly case depicted in Section 3 and introduce a competitive market of pollution
rights. The regulator sets the pollution cap E. Without loss of generality, we assume
that pollution permits are sold by means of an auction.12 One right corresponds to one
unit of emission and the competitive price of these rights is denoted by pE.
At the agent level, the competitive permit price operates like a Pigouvian tax. Under
our assumptions, the results obtained in Section 3 concerning the inverse demand and the
supply of abatement services by the monopoly extend to this case: it simply remains for
us to replace the Pigouvian tax  by the price pE of the emission rights. Thus, our result
is maintained if there exists a pollution cap Eopt with the property that the equilibrium
price of the pollution rights is equal to the optimal level of the Pigouvian tax introduced
in Proposition 1. This nevertheless leaves two questions open: (i) what is the value of
this pollution cap?, and (ii), more crucially, is pE =  opt the unique equilibrium of the
pollution permit market when this cap is set? Otherwise there may be several equilibria,
some of them being ine¢ cient.
To answer these two questions, let us observe that in our new setting, the quantities
introduced in Eqs (13) and (14) of Lemma 1 describe the equilibrium allocation conditional
on each pollution permit price pE. So if we want to look at the global equilibrium of this
vertical structure with tradable rights, we must clear the permit market. The demand for
pollution rights is given by:
ED(pE) = " (Q
m (pE))  Am (pE) (18)
and we observe that for any price pE  c there is full abatement, hence:
ED(pE) =

" ( 1 (pE))  (0) 1 (pE) if pE < c
0 if pE  c (19)
Now let us recall from our earlier discussion that  opt = D0 (" (Qopt)  Aopt) < c. Hence,
the optimal pollution cap must be:
Eopt = "
 
 1
 
 opt
  (0) 1   opt (20)
12For simplicity, we do not introduce the initial distribution of pollution permits explicitly. Following
Montgomery [22], the competitive equilibrium of a pollution permit market is obtained irrespective of
the initial distribution of permits.
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Moreover, to ensure that pE =  opt is the unique equilibrium, let us observe that the
demand for tradable rights is decreasing for all pE < c:
dED(pE)
dpE
=
"0 ( 1 (pE))
0 ( 1 (pE))
 

00

(0) 1 (pE)
 1
< 0 (21)
since under our assumptions, "; "0 > 0 and 0 < 0. We can therefore say:
Proposition 3. If pollution is regulated by a market of pollution rights, the regulator
also achieves an e¢ cient allocation by choosing the optimal pollution cap Eopt given by
Eq. (20).
4.3. Heterogeneous polluters
Finally, it is also interesting to verify whether this result extends to heterogeneous
polluters. So let us introduce m polluting rms, indexed by j, with di¤erent cost and
emission functions, cj(q) and "j(q), each of them satisfying the assumptions introduced
in Section 2. All the other assumptions are maintained, especially those concerning the
marginal damage at 0, so that an e¢ cient allocation is now given by:
8j P (Pmj=1qoptj )  c0j  qoptj  D0 Pmj=1"j  qoptj   Aopt :"0j  qoptj  = 0 (22a)
D0
Pm
j=1"j
 
qoptj
  Aopt  0(Aopt) = 0 (22b)
The intuition behind this extension is quite simple. Even if the polluting rms are
heterogeneous in costs and/or emissions, they invariably choose their level of abatement
by comparing the price pA with the Pigouvian tax  . One can therefore expect the
aggregate demand for abatement goods to behave in the same way: no abatement if
pA >  , full abatement denoted Af (pA) if pA <  and any situation between the two if
pA =  . Moreover, if the demand on the domain corresponding to full abatement is again
decreasing and bounded from above, the inverse demand has the same structure as that
obtained in Section 3.1. So, with similar assumptions on its elasticity, the properties of
the monopoly outcome provided in Lemma 1 should extend to the case of heterogeneous
polluters.
The main weakness of this argument is that the computation of the aggregate level
of abatement corresponding to full pollution reduction (Af (pA)) and, more generally, the
construction of the market-clearing production levels for all  and pA, are now trickier.
In fact - as in Section 3.1 - it is easy to compute the individual conditional demand
for abatement services and the cost function related to this activity. But to compute
the market-clearing production level, we now face a system of m equations, since for each
rm, the price of the polluting good is equal to the full marginal cost including abatement
cost. In other words, these individual production levels solve:
8j = 1; : : : ;m P
Pm
j=1qj

= c0j(qj) + min fpA; g  "0j(qj) (23)
instead of the single equation given by Eq. (7). Nevertheless, it can be shown that:
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Lemma 2. Under our assumptions on demand, costs and emissions, the system of Eqs.
(23) admits a unique solution (qj (k))
m
j=1 for each constant k = min fpA; g  0. More-
over, Af (pA) =
Pm
j=1 "j (qj(pA)) - the total quantity of abatement good which induces
full pollution reduction - is decreasing (for all pA  ) and bounded from above by
Amax =
Pm
j=1 "j (qj(0)).
It nally remains to verify that the Pigouvian tax  opt = D0
Pm
j=1"j
 
qoptj
  Aopt
(i) is lower than the highest tax hc that induces competitive behavior by the abatement
producer and (ii) can achieve the rst-best outcome.13 The rst part is obvious. If
 opt < hc , the eco-service rm equates its marginal cost with the Pigouvian tax, i.e.,
 opt = k0 (A) so that the second e¢ ciency condition (Eq. (22b)) is satised. Since, in this
case, the price of the abatement good is  opt, the set of Eqs 23 describing the equilibrium
production levels corresponds exactly to the rst e¢ ciency condition (Eqs. (22a)).
If  opt  hc , this implies, by the denition of hc , that the tax  opt is higher than the
marginal abatement cost which induces full abatement at price pA =  opt, i.e.,  opt >
k0(Af ( opt)). This again implies that one reduces, at the optimum, more pollution than
the existing level, which is impossible. We can therefore state that:
Proposition 4. Even if the polluting sector is composed of heterogeneous rms, espe-
cially in terms of their emissions, the regulator can neutralize the monopoly power on the
abatement service market and obtain the rst-best solution by setting the tax rate at the
marginal damage.
5. Cournot competition in the eco-industry
Let us now restore the representative polluting rm assumption, but now introduce
Cournot competition in the eco-service industry. There are now n heterogeneous rm
indexed by i in the eco-industry, each characterized by a cost function i(a). Seeing that
all the other assumptions are maintained, an e¢ cient allocation now veries:
8i = 1 : : : ; n (Qopt) = D0  "  Qopt Pni=1aopti  = i  aopti  (24)
Could we again implement the rst-best allocation by setting the Pigouvian tax at
 opt = D0 (" (Qopt) Pni=1aopt)? To answer this question, we rst study the best re-
ply of these Cournot players, since the behavior of the polluting rm remains unchanged
by construction.
13This threshold hc is now dened 
h
c = 
0  Af (hc ) and using a similar argument to that used in the
proof of Lemma 1, we can show that it exists and is unique.
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5.1. The best reply of a rm
The main di¢ culty appears at that stage. The di¤erent thresholds which characterize
the behavior of a monopoly now come out during the computation of the best response
and are linked to the behavior of the opponents. So instead of dealing with a piecewise
continuous monopoly solution, we have, even if the intuition is maintained, to manage
piecewise continuous best responses.
If we denote by A i =
Pn
j=1;j 6=ia
opt
j the aggregated abatement supply of the opponents,
this best response is given by:
BRi(A i; ) 2 arg max
ai
fmin f; p(ai + A i)g  ai   i (ai)g (25)
where p(A) =  (" 1 (A)) stands for the inverse demand corresponding to full abatement
behavior of the polluting industry. To gain some intuition about BRi(A i; ), we intro-
duce br(A i), the best response obtained when the demand always corresponds to full
abatement behavior, i.e., with p(a). This is dened by:
br(A i) = max
ai2[0;"(Qmax)]
p(ai + A i) ai   i (ai) (26)
and solves:
p0(ai + A i) ai + p(ai + A i)  0 (ai) = 0 (27)
We know that (i) bri("(Qmax)) = 0, since p ("(Qmax)) = 0, (ii) bri(0) = Am < "(Qmax) the
monopoly solution and (iii) bri is decreasing as long as e(p0) >  1, the elasticity of p0 is
larger than  1.
We now try to understand, at least graphically - see Figure 2 - what happens when
the constraint on the price, i.e. p(ai + A i)   , begins to matter.
In Figure 2, we consider the unconstrained best response bri(A i) and the  45 line
given by ai + A i = p 1(). Since p(a) is decreasing, this linear constraint provides, for
each A i, the minimum production level of rm i ensuring that the price is lower than  ,
or in other words, the minimal production level that preserves market power. So, as long
as the best reply bri(A i) lies above this line, the rm is able to exert market power, i.e.,
his best reply is BRi(A i; ) = bri(A i). This remains true until bri(A i) cuts this line.
This intersection occurs when the A i is equal to Mi () which is dened by:
p0(p 1())  p 1() Mi ()+    0i  p 1() Mi () = 0 (28)
If A i Mi (), rm i is, as in the monopoly case, unable to manipulate the price. This
is why it becomes optimal to produce the quantity that keeps the price at  . In other
words, the best reply is BRi(A i; ) = p 1()   A i. However, as A i decreases, rm i
increases its market share while the price remains constant at  . It is therefore possible
for the marginal production cost to be higher than the price. This situation occurs for all
A i < mi () with mi () solution to:
0i
 
p 1() mi ()

=  , mi () = p 1 ()  (0i) 1 () (29)
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Figure 2: The best response of Firm i
In this last case, the best reply depicts a competitive behavior and is given byBRi(A i; ) =
(0i)
 1 (). Moreover, by construction, it is immediate that mi () Mi ().
This explanation nevertheless requires that (i) the line ai + A i = p 1() crosses
bri(A i) at a unique positive point and (ii) p 1 ()   (0i) 1 ()  0, otherwise some of
these cases are vacuous. A formal construction of the best response is provided in the
appendix. We show that the case depicted in Figure 1 only occurs when the rate  is
lower than  ic given by 
i
c = 
0
i(p
 1 ( ic)), i.e., the upper bound of the tax rates at which
rm i adopts a competitive behavior. But it is essentially this set of taxes in which we
are interested. This is why we only spell out the characterization of the best reply for
   ic .
Lemma 3. For any tax rate  <  ic and any A i 2 [0; " 1(Qmax)], the best response of an
eco-service rm is given by:
BR(A i; ) =
8<: (
0
i)
 1 () if A i < mi ()
p 1()  A i if mi ()  A i Mi ()
bri(A i) if A i Mi ()
(30)
Moreover, this best response is continuous and, since e(p0) >  1, it is also non-increasing
with A i.
5.2. Cournot equilibrium and e¢ cient taxation
From the previous Lemma, we essentially learn that competitive behavior is part of
the best response of rm i when    ic . So we will now concentrate on taxes smaller than
minc = mini=1;:::;n f icg. In this case, it can be shown that:
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Lemma 4. For any tax  < minc , the unique equilibrium supply of eco-services is, for
each rm, aCi () = (
0
i)
 1 (), while the price of these services is PCA () =  . From Eq
(7), we observe that the production of the dirty good is QC() =  1 ().
The existence part of this result is obvious. Since  < minc , then 8i,  < 0i(p 1 ())
by the denition of  ic or equivalently 8i, (0i) 1 () < p 1 (). We can therefore say that:
8i Ac i =
nX
j=1;j 6=i
 
0j
 1
() < p 1 ()  (0i) 1 () = mi () (31)
This means from Eq. (30) that playing aCi = (
0
i)
 1 () is a best response for each rm.
Concerning uniqueness, let us rst observe that the best response is bounded from above
by (0i)
 1 (). So if there exists another equilibrium, say bC , there must be at least one rm
i0 such that bCi0 <
 
0i0
 1
() and, due to the upper bound, Bc i0 
Pn
j=1;j 6=i0
 
0j
 1
().
But this leads to a contradiction, since for  < minc , we have as before that B
c
 i0 < mi0 (),
so that bCi0 =
 
0i0
 1
() should be the best response.
Let us now assume that the regulator sets  opt = D0
 
" (Qopt) Pni=1aopti . If  opt 
minc , the Cournot equilibrium meets the rst-best conditions given by Eq. (24) since, by
Lemma 4, we have:
8i = 1 : : : ; n   QC( opt) =  opt = 0i  aCi ( opt) (32)
It remains for us to verify that  opt  minc . If this is not the case, there must exist at least
one agent, say i0, for which  opt > 0i0(p
 1 ( opt)). But this implies, for our characterization
of an optimal allocation (Eq. (24)), that:
aopti0 =
 
0i0
 1
( opt) > p 1
 
 opt

= "
 
 1
 
 opt

= "(Qopt) (33)
so that
Pn
i=1 a
opt
i0
> "(Qopt), since all the aopti  0. In other words there is, at the optimum,
more abatement than emissions, which is a contradiction. We can therefore say:
Proposition 5. If there is Cournot competition in an eco-service industry and pure com-
petition in the polluting sector, the rst-best allocation can be reached by setting the tax
rate to the marginal damage as usual.
6. Two main limits of the result
We have extended our leading case of Section 3 to various settings. Both main as-
sumptions nevertheless remained: an upstream non competitive market of eco-services
and a downstream competition polluting industry. In this section, we show that both
assumptions are crucial. We rst introduce a counter example showing that our result
cannot be extended to abatement goods. In a second step we introduce downstream
monopoly power. Due to this new market imperfection, the rst-best allocation cannot
be implemented. In this case, we show that the optimal Pigouvian tax must be lower
than the marginal damage, thus nding Barnetts result [2].
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6.1. Abatement goods versus abatement services
Our results only apply for environmental services, whereas most of the literature con-
siders environmental goods. In this latter case and under an "end-of-pipe" pollution as-
sumption (see Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas [20]), the emissions "(Q;A) are for the dirty
rm negatively correlated with the use of abatement goods. The marginal productivity
of abatement goods ( @A"(Q;A)) therefore matters in the abatement choice, contrary to
abatement services for which the purchase decision is only based on the di¤erence between
the environmental tax and the price. As we will show, this strongly reduces the control
that the regulator has over the equilibrium and limits implementation of the rst-best
allocation.
As the case of abatement goods is largely documented in the literature under alter-
native sets of assumptions, we simply illustrate our purpose by a (counter) example to
highlight what changes compared with eco-services.
Example 1. We consider (i) quadratic cost functions, i.e., c(Q) = 1
2
Q2 and (A) = 1
2
A2,
(ii) a linear demand P = 1 Q, (iii) a linear damage function D(E) = 0:2E and (iv) an
emission function "(Q;A) = max
n
Q pA; 0
o
which is now "non-linear" in abatement.
If we construct the inverse demand for abatement goods as in Section 3.1, we observe,
after some computation, that the conditional demand for abatement goods and the cost
associated with this activity are given by:
A(pA; ; Q) = min

Q2;


2pA
2
CA(pA; ; Q) =
(
pAQ
2 if Q  
2pA
Q  2
2pA
if Q > 
2pA
(34)
As expected, the conditional demand does not move from full abatement (here Q2) to
no abatement, since


2pA
2
is a demand for partial pollution reduction. Moreover, the
marginal cost @QCA associated with this activity is no longer linear in quantities, since
@QCA = min f2pAQ; g. This drastically modies the computation of the dirty good
market clearing condition, which is given by:
P (Q) =
dc
dQ
+
@CA
@Q
, 1 Q = Q+ min f2pAQ; g
, Q(pA; ) =
 1
2(1+pA)
if pA  (1 + pA)
1 
2
else
(35)
It follows that the demand for abatement goods consistent with market clearing and the
inverse demand curve are:
A(pa; ) = min

1
2(1+pA)
2
;


2pA
2
PA(A; ) =
(

2
p
A
if A <
 
1 
2
2
1
2
p
A
  1 if A   1 
2
2 (36)
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Since 1
2
p
A
  1 stands for p(A), the inverse demand under full abatement, this inverse
demand can be written as PA(A; ) = min
n
p(A); 
2
p
A
o
. Clearly, this expression di¤ers
from min fp(A); g. The monopoly is now able to exert market power on the whole
range of its inverse demand. The at part disappears but a kink remains. This is why
the monopoly solution nevertheless leads to three di¤erent outcomes: (i) the monopoly
solution under partial abatement for small taxes, (ii) a solution which sticks in the kink
of the inverse demand curve, and (iii) the monopoly strategy under full abatement for
high taxes. It can be shown, in this example, that:
Am() 
8><>:
 

4
2=3
for  < 0:2291 
1 
2
2
for  2 [0:2291; 0:5265]
0:0561 for  > 0:5265
and Qm() 
  
1 
2

for   0:5265
0:2368 for  > 0:5265
(37)
Moreover, a simple computation shows that Aopt = 0:2 and Qopt = 0:4. As Am() is
bounded from above by 0:1485, the rst-best outcome is unreachable simply because the
monopoly can now take a margin in the case of full and partial pollution abatement.
6.2. Downstream market power and Barnetts result
As we will see, our result is also limited by the number of market failures and/or imper-
fections that the regulator controls. We have shown that one instrument, the Pigouvian
tax, can regulate the environmental externality in the dirty sector and the imperfect com-
petition problem in the eco-service industry. However, this result will fail if a new market
imperfection is introduced. In this case, the regulator can only implement a second-best
policy. To illustrate this problem, let us return to the basic case of Section 3, and introduce
monopoly power in the dirty sector instead of pure competition.14
We will obtain the same results as Barnett [2] under this new framework, since we will
show that the second-best Pigouvian tax must be lower than the marginal damage. This
result therefore contrasts with Canton et al. [6]. To t with both papers, we assume a
linear damage function D(E) = vE.
Let us rst quickly revisit Section 3 in order to see what changes. Since the dirty rm
remains competitive on the abatement market, its conditional demand and the abatement
cost CA(pA; ; Q) = min fpA; g  "(Q) both remain unchanged. As this rm now has
monopoly power on the output market, its output choice therefore satises:
Qm 2 arg max
Q
P (Q)Q  c (Q) min fpA; g  "(Q) (38)
If we assume, as usual for a monopoly, that the elasticity eP =
QdP
PdQ
of the inverse demand
curve belongs to [ 1; 0) and is decreasing, the solution of this program can be summarized
14This is clearly a simplifying assumption. Similar results can be obtained by introducing Cournot
competition on the downstream polluting good market. We introduce monopoly power on the output
market in order to remain as close as possible to Barnetts paper [2].
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by the following FOC:
P 0 (Q)Q+ P (Q)  c0(Q) min fpA; g  "0(Q)  0 (with equality if Q > 0) (39)
This equation is quite similar to the FOC under competition (see Eq. 6). So, let us now
introduce:
m(Q) =
P 0 (Q)Q+ P (Q)  c0(Q)
"0(Q)
(40)
instead of the marginal benet for pollution (Q). This function shares similar properties
with (Q): (i) it is positive up to Qm, which is now the monopoly production level without
environmental regulation, and (ii) it is decreasing on

0; Qm

under our restriction on the
elasticity eP .15 It follows that Q =  1m (min fpA; g) and the rest of the argument of
Section 3.1 and 3.2 can be extended to this case, as long as we replace the function  by
m and p(A) by pm(A) = m (" 1 (A)). Hence:
Lemma 5. If the elasticity of pm(A) is decreasing and belongs to ( 1; 0), the equilibrium
quantities with upstream and downstream monopoly power are given by:
A() =

(0) 1 () for  < c
" (Q()) for   c and Q
() =  1m (min f;  0mg) (41)
with c dened as in Eq. (12) and  0m given by 
0
m =
1
1+epm (p
 1
m ( 0m))
0(p 1 ( 0m)). Moreover,
the price of the abatement services is P A = min f;  0mg.
Now, to nd the second-best Pigouvian tax, we have to solve:
max

Z Q()
0
P (q)dq   c (Q())   (A()) D (max f" (Q())  A(); 0g)| {z }
=SB()
(42)
As the equilibrium quantities A() and Q() are constant 8   0m (see Eq. 41),
8   0m, SB() is also constant. We can therefore restrict our attention to tax rates
 2 [0;  0m]. So let us now consider a tax  2 (c;  0m]. In this case, the monopoly supply
of abatement services totally removes pollution. It follows that 8 2 ( c; m):
dSB()
d
= (P (Q())  c0 (Q())  0 (" (Q())) "0 (Q())) dQ

d
(43)
Since the FOC of the polluting rm (see Eq. (39)) is satised at equilibrium and P A =
min f;  0mg, Eq. (43) becomes:
dSB()
d
= ( P 0 (Q())Q() + (   0 (" (Q()))) "0 (Q())) dQ

d
(44)
15This follows from computation and the fact that (i) P 00(Q)Q+ 2P 0(Q) = P 0(Q) (1 + eP ) +P dePdQ and
(ii) m(Q)  0 on

0; Qm

.
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Moreover, dQ
()
d
= 1=
 

0
m (
 1
m ())

< 0, since m is decreasing and by the denition of
c (see Eq. (12)), and we know that 8 2 ( c; m),  > 0 (A ()). We can therefore
assert that 8 2 ( c; m), dSB()
d
< 0.
Following these developments a second-best solution necessarily belongs to [0; c]. If
this solution is an interior one, we can write:
dSB()
d
= (P (Q())  c0 (Q())  v"0 (Q())) dQ

d
  (0 (A())  v) dA

d
= 0 (45)
By using the FOC of the polluting rm (see Eq. (39)) again, we have:
( P 0 (Q())Q() + (   v) "0 (Q())) dQ

d
  (   v) dA

d
= 0 (46)
which implies that:
 sb   v = P
0 (Q())Q()dQ

d
"0 (Q()) dQ

d
  dA
d
< 0 (47)
since 8 2 [0; c], dAd = 1=k00
 
(k0) 1 ()

> 0 and dQ
()
d
= 1=
 

0
m (
 1
m ())

< 0. We can
therefore state:
Proposition 6. If there is monopoly power on the nal good and on the abatement ser-
vice market, the second-best taxation rule neutralizes the market power on the abatement
service market (since  sb  c), but remains lower than the marginal damage to limit the
reduction of the production of the nal good induced by the monopoly power.
7. Concluding remarks
The EGSS is highly concentrated. The economic literature has mainly analyzed the
design of environmental regulation while taking this feature into account. However, no
study has yet analyzed the extent to which distinguishing between abatement goods and
abatement services matters for environmental regulation. That was the topic of this
paper. We found a very interesting result for policy makers. Whereas there are two
market failures in our economy - market power on the abatement service market and
pollution generated by downstream rms - the regulator can reach the rst-best outcome
with only one tool: environmental regulation. This result challenges the Tinbergen rule.
Abatement services introduce a at part in the inverse demand curve since the pol-
luting rm only makes a trade-o¤ between the price of the abatement services and the
Pigovian tax to comply with the environmental regulation. He is indi¤erent between both
choices if the price of the abatement service equals the Pigovian tax. In this context, an
accurate setting of the Pigovian tax can lead the monopoly to choose the rst-best level
of production. We have shown that if this tax is set so that it is equal to the marginal
damage, the economy reaches the rst-best outcome.
We then extended our model to chech the robustness of the result. We rst set
assumptions such as that total abatement is allowed; we then considered a pollution
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permit market instead the Pigovian tax, and thirdly, we studied heterogenous polluters.
We nally assumed that instead of a monopoly, the eco-industry was characterized by
Cournot competition. We nished by underlining some limits of our result. It no longer
holds if we consider abatement goods instead of services or if we add another market
failure in the output market.
If we essentially explore the case of upstream market power as a limit to our result,
other additional market imperfections could also be considered. If a pollution permit
market is organized, a polluting rm may exert a dominant position on this market, e.g.,
simple manipulation (see Hahn [19] and Westskog [39], or manipulating the costs of its
opponents on the output market (what is called exclusionary manipulation - see Misiolek
and Elder [21], Sartzetakis [31] or Von der Fehr [38]). Some other externalities, such as
a polluting eco-industry (see Sans et al. [30]) may also modify our result. In this case,
the Pigouvian tax modies not only the demand for the abatement rms but also the
production costs of the abater.
In this article, we also restrict our attention to a benevolent regulator controlling a
closed economy. However, it is well-known that lobbies inuence the denition of environ-
mental policy (Aidt [1]), and abatement services are often exchanged on an international
market. Canton [4] studies the role of lobbies in the case of an eco-industry providing
environmental goods. In an open economy, each rm is subject to national environmental
regulations. In this case, environmental policies can be used in a strategic way (see for
instance Barrett [3] or Hamilton and Requate [18]). Nimubona [23] studies the e¤ect
of reductions in trade barriers on the eco-industry sector that were agreed in the Doha
Round of the WTO.
Further research is needed to investigate how taking these new features into account
might challenge or modify our results.
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A. Proof of Lemma 1
We need to solve:
max
A2[0;"(Qmax)]
[min f; p (A)gA   (A)]| {z }
(A;)
where p (A) = 
 
" 1 (A)

Step 1 : Existence of a unique solution
Since we maximize (A; ) over a compact set, it remains to verify that (A; ) is strictly concave in
A. Moreover,  (A) being strictly convex, we only need to check that min fA; p (A)Ag is concave. But
let us rst observe that, under the assumption that ep(" (Qmax)) >  1 and dep(A)dA  0, p (A)A is concave
since :
d2
(dA)
2 (p (A) :A) = p
0(A) (ep(A) + 1) + p(A)
dep(A)
da
 0
It follows that 8 2 [0; 1] and 8A1; A2 2 [0; " (Qmax)]
min f (A1 + (1  )A2) ; p ((A1 + (1  )A2)) (A1 + (1  )A2)g
 min fA1 + (1  ) A2; p (A1)A1 + (1  ) p (A2)A2g (concavity of p(A)A)
 min fA1; p (A1)A1g+ (1  ) min fA2; p (A2)A2g (concavity of the min fx; yg
Step 2 : Construction of the thresholds
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This program is not smooth but nevertheless concave. This means (see Rockafellar [29]) that an
optimum is reached i¤ 0 2 @A where @A denotes the sub-derivative of (A; ) with respect to A. By
computation, we get:
@A =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
   0(A) if A < p 1 ()264 + p0(p 1 ())p 1 ()  0  p 1 ()| {z }
:=m()
;    0  p 1 ()| {z }
:=c()
375 if A = p 1 ()
p (A) + p0(A)A  0 (A) if A > p 1 ()
(48)
Now observe that m () = 0 and c () = 0 implicitly denes the two thresholds c and m introduced
in Eqs (11) and (12). It remains to verify that these thresholds exist, are unique and that c < m. These
results directly follow from the next observations:
(i) c and m are both increasing. More precisely, 0c () = 1 
00(p 1())
p0(p 1()) > 0, and
0m () =
d
d

(p(A) + p0(A)A)  (A)jA=p 1()

=

d2
(dA)2
(p (A)A)  00 (A)

| {z }
<0 (second order condition)

A=p 1()
 1p0(p 1()) > 0
(ii) lim!0 c() < 0 and lim!0 m() < 0. Let us remember that p (" (Qmax)) = 0; it follows that
lim!0 c() =  0 (" (Qmax)) < 0 and lim!0 m() = p0 (" (Qmax)) " (Qmax)  0 (" (Qmax)) < 0
(iii) lim!m c() > 0 and lim!+1 m() > 0. From the implicit denition of m, we observe that
lim!m c() =  p0(p 1 (m))p 1 (m) > 0. Concerning the second limit, we note:
lim
!+1m() = lim!+1 

1 + ep(A)jA=p 1()

  lim
!+1
0  p 1 ()
The second term of the r.h.s. is clearly bounded since p 1 () 2 [0; " (Qmax)]. If we now remember that
ep(A) is decreasing and ep(" (Qmax)) >  1, we have lim!+1 m() = +1:
Step 3 : The optimal provision of abatement services
Let us come back to the subdi¤erential given by Eq (48). With similar arguments as in (i) of Step
2, it can now be argued that the rst and the last equation of Eqs (48) are both decreasing function. Let
us also note that (i) limA!0 (   0(A)) =   0 and (ii)
limA!"(Qmax) (p (A) + p
0(A)A  0 (A)) = limA!"(Qmax) (p (A) (1 + ep(A))  0 (A)) =  0 (" (Qmax))
since by construction p (" (Qmax)) = 0 and ep(A) bounded. From these observations and the fact that at
a maximum 0 2 @A, we can immediately say that:
(i) if c () < 0 or, equivalently,  < c, the zero of @A is given by    0(A) = 0, so that
A = (0) 1 ()
(ii) if m ()  0 and c ()  0, or  2 [c; m], the zero is obtained for A = p 1 ()
(iii) if m () > 0, i.e.  > m, the optimal provision solves the last equation and this is nothing else
than the standard monopoly solution associated to p(A) (i.e. without the kink introduced by the min
function).
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Step 1 : Existence of a solution
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Let us denote by Q =
Pm
j=1qj and let take min f; pAg as given. We observe that (i) the r.h.s. of each
equation of Eqs (23) is increasing in qj since c
00
j ; "
00
j > 0 (ii) the range of these functions is [0;+1) since
c0j(0) = "
0
j(0) = 0 and both functions goes to +1 as qj ! +1. We can therefore reverse the function
given by the r.h.s. and say that qj = j(Q). Moreover, we also observe that (i) limQ!0 j(Q) = +1
since limQ!0 P (Q) = +1 so that the equality (23) requires that qj ! +1, and (ii) limQ!+1 j(Q) = 0
since limQ!+1 P (Q) = 0 and therefore qj ! 0 to maintain the equality.
Let us now aggregate over the qj . We obtain Q =
Pm
j=1 j(Q). So if there exists a solution in Q to
this equation our existence problem is solved. It remains to observe that (i) (Q) = Q Pmj=1 j(Q) is
continuous (ii) limQ!0 (Q) =  1 and (iii) limQ!+1 j(Q) = +1.
Step 2 : Uniqueness of the solution
Let us set K = min f; pAg and write the system (23) as:
	

(qj)
m
j=1 ;K

=
 
c0j(qj) +K:"
0
j(qj)
m
j=1
  P
Pm
j=1qj

e with e0 = (1; : : : ; 1)
By computation, we observe that @(qj)mj=1	 = D   P 0
Pm
j=1qj

e  e0 where D is a diagonal matrix
whose generic term is c
00
j (qj) + K"
00
j (qj). This symmetric matrix is clearly positive denite since c
00
j ,
"
00
j > 0 and P
0 < 0. It follows from Gale-Nikaido (1965 Theorem 6) that the solution (qj(K))
m
j=1 of
	

(qj)
m
j=1 ;K

= 0 is unique for every K.
Step 3 : Af (K) =
Pm
j=1 "j (qj(K)) is decreasing
Let us rst observe from the implicit theorem applied to 	

(qj)
m
j=1 ;K

= 0 that
@(qj)
m
j=1
@K =
 

@(qj)mj=1	
 1
  "0j(qj)mj=1. It follows that:
dAf
dK =
 
"0j(qj)
m
j=1
0
 @(qj)
m
j=1
@K =  
 
"0j(qj)
m
j=1
0


@(qj)mj=1	
 1
  "0j(qj)mj=1| {z }
>0
< 0
since the inverse of a positive denite matrix remains positive denite.
C. Proof of Lemma 3
We need to solve for all A i 2 [0; " (Qmax)]
max
ai2[0;"(Qmax) A i]
[min f; p (ai +A i)g (ai +A i)  i (ai)]| {z }
i(ai;A i;)
where p (A) = 
 
" 1 (A)

Step 1 : i(ai; A i; ) is strictly concave in a i
Under the assumption that ep(" (Qmax)) >  1 and dep(A)dA  0, we have for ai > 0:
0 > aiA

p0(A) (ep(A) + 1) + p(A)
dep(A)
da

= P 00(A)ai + 2aiA P
0(A)
> P 00(A)ai + 2P 0(A) = @
2
(@ai)
2 [p (ai +A i) ai]
We can therefore use the similar argument as in Step 1 of Lemma 1 in order to show that i(ai; A i; )
is strictly concave in ai. We simply need to decompose A in (ai + A i) and take a convex combination
of two ai.
Step 2 : the subdi¤erential and the thresholds
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Let us now compute the sub-derivate of i(ai; A i; ) with respect to ai. For A i < p 1 (), we
obtain:
@ai =
8>><>>:
   0i(ai) if ai < p 1 () A i
'im (;A i) ; '
i
c (;A i)

if ai = p 1 () A i
p (ai +A i) + p0 (ai +A i) ai   0i (ai)| {z }
:= i(ai;A i)
if ai > p 1 () A i (49)
with

'im (;A i) =  + p
0(p 1 ())
 
p 1 () A i
  0i  p 1 () A i
'ic (;A i) =    0i
 
p 1 () A i

If A i  p 1 (), the rst and even the second line (if A i > p 1 ()) are simply vacuous.
So let us for the moment assume that A i < p 1 () and let us introduce the thresholds mi()
and Mi() given by 'ic (;mi()) = 0 and '
i
m (;Mi(t)) = 0. Concerning mi(), we observe that (i)
@A i'
i
c (;A i) = 
00
i
 
p 1 () A i

> 0, (ii) limA i!p 1() 'c(;A i) =  > 0 and (iii) limA i!0 '
i
c(;A i) =
   0i
 
p 1 ()

= ic() this last function being the same as in Eq. (48) but now indexed by agent i. So
by using the Step 2 of the proof of Lemma 1, we know that
 
ic
0
> 0 and that there exists a unique  ic
such that ic(
i
c) = 0. We can therefore say that: 8   ic , 9mi() 2 0; p 1 () , 'c (;mi()) = 0
8 >  ic , 'c (;A i) > 0 for all A i 2

0; p 1 ()

ConcerningMi(), we now observe that (i) @A i'm (;A i) = 
00  p 1 () A i > 0, (ii) limA i!p 1() 'm(;A i) =
 > 0 and (iii) limA i!0 'm(;A i) = 
i
m() this last function being again the same as in Eq (48)). Using
again Step 2 of the proof of Lemma 1, we have: 8   im, 9Mi() 2 0; p 1 () , 'm (;Mi()) = 0
8 >  im, 'im (;A i) > 0 for all Ai 2

0; p 1 ()

Finally since 'im (;A i) < '
i
c (;A i) and both are increasing we can say that for    ic ,mi() < Mi().
Step 3 : The unconstraint best response
Let us concentrate on the last equation of Eq. (49). If we compute the associated best response
(without taking care to ai > p 1 () A i) we obtain a standard best response bri(A i) which corresponds
to a Cournot game in which the inverse demand is p(A). This function exists for all A i 2

0; " 1(Qmax)

,
since (i)  i (ai; A i) is decreasing in ai (see Step 1 and remember that 00 > 0), (ii) limai!0  i (ai; A i) =
p(A i) (1 + ep(A i)) > 0 since ep >  1 by assumption and (iii) limai!(" 1(Qmax) A i)  i (ai; A i) =
 0i
 
" 1(Qmax) A i

< 0 for A i < " 1(Qmax) while for A i = " 1(Qmax) the best response is ai = 0.
Step 4 : The best response
Three cases must be distinguished.
Case 1 :  >  im
In this case we have 'ic (;A i) > '
i
m (;A i) > 0. If we now keep in mind that (   0(ai)) is
decreasing and converges to 'ic (;A i) as ai !
 
p 1 () A i

, @ai only admits a zero in third case of
Eq (49). In other words the best response is BRi(A i; ) = bri(A i) dened in Step 3.
Case 2 :  2   ic ;  im
Here we know that 'ic (;A i) > 0 and therefore    0i(ai) > 0 for all ai < p 1 ()   A i, but
9Mi() 2

0; p 1 ()

, 'im (;Mi()) = 0. This means that the best response is given by:
BRi(A i; ) =

p 1 () A i for all A i Mi ()
bri(A i) else
Case 3 :    ic
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In this case both thresholds matter so that the best response is given by:
BRi(A i; ) =
8<: (
0
i)
 1
() for all A i < mi()
p 1 () A i for all A i 2 [mi();Mi ()]
bri(Ai) else
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